Monday, February 8, 2021

Downs-Thomson housing paradox

Anthony Downs and various others made the observation that “the equilibrium speed of car traffic on a road network is determined by the average door-to-door speed of equivalent journeys taken by public transport.”

Though known as the Downs-Thomson (DT) paradox, it is not a paradox at all. It is merely an observation that people adapt their behaviours to road network changes that affect the cost of driving.

The basic idea is that there are three margins from which substitution towards peak hour use of new freeway capacity occurs.
  1. many drivers who formerly used alternative routes during peak hours switch to the improved expressway (spatial convergence), and
  2. many drivers who formerly travelled just before or after the peak hours start travelling during those hours (time convergence), and
  3. some commuters who used to take public transportation during peak hours now switch to driving, since it has become faster (modal convergence).
This is a simple application of the logic of substitution in microeconomic consumer theory. If an alternative has a lower economic cost for the same value gained, people will substitute towards the lower-cost alternative. Consumer choices are what enables markets to select for the more efficient producers and mix of goods and services over time as they respond to relative prices. 

In the DT example, the three alternatives and the peak hour freeway use start at the initial equilibrium. Prior to the new freeway, all the transport alternatives are taken up to the degree that the total cost (time/money/convenience) is equalised across them.

The cost of travelling on an alternative route, or at an alternative time, or using an alternative mode, is roughly the same as the cost of peak hour freeway transport. It must be because if it wasn’t there would be a substitution towards the lower-cost option.


If you reduce the cost of one of these alternatives what happens? That option begins to look relatively attractive, and people substitute from the other alternatives until there are no remaining gains from substitution.

Afterwards, the new equilibrium looks like this. I’ve put a dashed line at the old equilibrium to show that there can be overall gains from expanding transport capacity, even though they are not observed in the option that received the investment.[1]

How much below the previous equilibrium the cost profile of the transport alternatives remains depends on how much these costs can adjust downwards and the preference for substituting towards non-transport uses of time and money.

For example, if alternative transport modes have a fixed cost (e.g. taking the train in peak hour has a fixed price and time cost that does not change based on usage), then the new cost equilibrium will occur at the same level as previously. That fixed cost of the alternative mode will anchor the equilibrium time and cost level at which these options equilibrate.

This is what is meant by the observation that “the equilibrium speed of car traffic on a road network is determined by the average door-to-door speed of equivalent journeys taken by public transport.”[2]

Similar margins of substitution happen in housing. Housing is another spatial allocation problem where the cost involves a trade-off between price and time costs amongst alternatives.

Location alternatives are one such margin. Total cost equilibrates, via rent adjustment, between comparable dwellings at alternative locations based on relative transport/accessibility costs.

When the transport/accessibility cost of a location falls, the rent in that area rises so that there are no gains from substitution between locations.



Another margin of substitution in housing is between modes, like renting and buying. When the cost of some buying goes up, it can drag up the cost of renting as market participants close the gap between buying and renting. Alternatively, if the cost of renting falls, it tends to pull down the cost of buying.

What if there is another alternative housing mode? Say, a social or public housing option that has a fixed price. In this case, the point at which there is no substitution between them is where they all have the same economic cost.

If the cost of public housing falls, this puts pressure on the housing equilibrium. Homebuyers and renters begin substituting to this cheaper alternative, just like the case of the new freeway in transport equilibrium.

This substitution process continues until there are no gains from substituting between housing modes. Public (non-market) housing alternatives can create an anchor for prices, just as public transport alternatives anchor congestion levels.

One could argue that “the equilibrium price of housing in a private market is determined by the average price of equivalent public housing.”

Our policy choice not to extensively provide cheap housing alternatives has allowed housing prices to be anchored by the maximum willingness to pay in the market rather than the cost of public housing.

The DT paradox is why places with low traffic congestion are usually those that have good alternatives. It is also why places with cheaper private housing markets have cheaper and more widely available non-market alternatives.

[1] This is actually how monetary policy works. The overnight cash rate is manipulated, and then all the alternative interest rates shift because there is a substitution between the overnight rate and long-dated assets.

[2] The D-T paradox has implications for pricing choices on transport networks. For example, peak-hour congestion charging will raise the cost fo driving, creating substitution to alternatives, including the alternative of not travelling. When a new rail line is built to relieve pressure on roads, tickets must be priced low enough to attract people towards that alternative and away from road travel. If new rail lines are privately owned and earn a return from ticket sales only, they have an incentive to maximise their own revenue, but this may involve a ticket price that is too high to maximise overall transport gains by attracting more substitution away from road travel. New toll roads also are likely to over-price compared to the optimum for the network as a whole that would see more substitution to these new roads.

9 comments:

  1. But for public housing alternatives to anchor the market, it needs to be provided in abundance. I don't see why the public cost is justified.

    Also, artificially (using subsidized housing) lowering rents will reduce the incentive to build new housing, lowering the supply, which means even more demand for the subsidized option.

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    1. "artificially (using subsidized housing) lowering rents will reduce the incentive to build new housing"

      Will it? I don't think the level of rent has much to do with the rate of new housing supply.

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  2. "I don't think the level of rent has much to do with the rate of new housing supply."

    How can it not have?

    The price of housing is determined by the expected discounted present value of the rental cash flow (I think you made this point yourself previously).

    Reduce the rent and you reduce the price, and hence the incentive to build new housing is lower.

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    1. I have a whole paper explaining the dynamic incentives for new housing development.
      https://osf.io/7n8rj/

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  3. There are 2 inconsistencies in this blog I take issue with.

    Firstly in the example where you show reduction in transport costs being replaced by increases in rent, you don't match this by the same principle you used previously which should indicate that overall rents are reduced (for land with equivalent grade of location A, as you have increased the supply of grade A land). You stated:
    There can be overall gains from expanding transport capacity, even though they are not observed in the option that received the investment.

    I guess Richardo's law would mean that overall rent shouldn't fall unless the improved supply of higher grade land reduces demand for marginal land and subsequently raises the margin.


    The second is to do with this idea that rising property prices for buyers increase rents. This doesn't make sense at all. When renters buy homes and become homeowners (substitution), they buy from... Non owner-occupiers i.e. investors. The supply of rental housing and demand for rental housing shrinks simultaneously.
    The same applies when investors get a buying edge over potential homebuyers. They buy homes off owner-occupiers and subsequently increase rental supply for the potential homeowners who are now stuck renting. The only thing that changes is the size/composition of the rental and owner-occupier markets. Property prices do not affect rents, and if they do it would be highly localised.

    Prices surely more a function of the rental income itself or yields, and subsequently interest rates and taxes. The rental income of land is determined by Richardo's law and not the capitalised value of that income flow. Saying the income flow is determined by the capitalised price destroys any sensible property pricing theory. I don't know how you can say this as someone who's worked in valuation.

    It's like saying that a stock price determines dividends and company revenue. The only possible way for that to manifest is if the company raises capital off the higher stock price, increases its investment and then subsequent returns to justify the stock price. But that's unrelatable to land because land is a monopoly with no "investment" that improves output or returns as a result of higher prices for it.

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    1. " rising property prices for buyers increase rents. This doesn't make sense at all. When renters buy homes and become homeowners (substitution), they buy from... Non owner-occupiers i.e. investors. The supply of rental housing and demand for rental housing shrinks simultaneously."

      This is all true. But the price at which this occurs can vary to equalise the value of substituting between renting vs buying. I used to think that prices can't affect rents, but then, that means nor can the provision of any other alternative mode of housing access (public and social housing, etc)

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    2. It could be possible...

      Problem is empirical data generally shows that rents are almost entirely driven by wages and employment, with almost not impact from supply. I doubt prices factor much into it.

      The problem could be there are few jurisdictions (if any) that have enough "fixed price alternatives" to actually give this affect. Social/public housing isn't able to achieve this affect unless it is a viable alternative, which given the limited stock it is not. Would building more reduce rents and subsequently prices? Probably, given it saps private housing demand i.e. rents and subsequently prices.

      I don't see how this rationalises prices affecting rents though. The only way prices could affect rents is through the development process i.e. supply of new dwellings being affected by prices (price growth) and not just rental return i.e. you need to tie in your housing balance sheet stuff to make the explanation make more sense. The analogy I gave only holds in a static world where supply and population is stagnant.

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  4. I'm curious about what kind of thing this sentence refers to:
    "When the cost of some buying goes up, it can drag up the cost of renting as market participants close the gap between buying and renting"

    Do you have an example of this phenomena?

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    1. https://www.fresheconomicthinking.com/2019/03/high-home-prices-jack-up-rents.html

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