Queensland’s Strategic Cropping Land

I have been critical about the farming lobby’s reaction to the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, and I have also been very critical about the value of food security, especially when used as a justification for agricultural subsidies.

My general belief is that farmers should be treated like any other business and face risks from their investment decisions.  Because this belief I strongly support Queensland’s new Strategic Cropping Land Policy. 

The policy under development gives farmers a chance to opt out of mining and gas production on their land. Currently land owners must allow mineral and gas exploration and development on their land. The mining industry has legislative power behind it to explore for, and mine, the States mineral resources (have a look at your title deed and you will note that even freehold land owners don’t own the minerals under their land).

This means that miners do not need to buy any property rights from existing land owners to conduct activities on privately owned land. They do however need to provide some compensation for disruption to activities (as prescribed under the relevant acts).

In the greatest of ironies, agricultural policies in this country have protected farmers from their own business decisions (eg. subsidising water supplies, making drought and flood payments - I argue these events are part of the natural weather cycle and should be anticipated), yet have not protected farmers from external threats to from mining.

It took a while for the food security lobby to realise that the food production of the country rests in the land, soil and water, not in the individual businesses of farmers. If a farm business fails, the productive capacity remains for the next buyer of the property. But if land, soil and water is irreversibly damaged, then potential food production capacity is destroyed.

With these bizarre policies in place it is possible to have the situation where a farmer is receiving drought relief payments on the one hand to save his business, while the government is supporting the demise of his ability to farm on the other hand by allowing coal seam gas wells to be peppered across his fields.

In the Darling Downs the preservation of the water quality in underground aquifers is especially important. These aquifers are a significant source of water for agriculture and there is a reasonable probability that drilling through this aquifer many thousands of times to reach the deeper coal seam will contaminate the water. And unlike a river system which flushes water readily, underground aquifers may take hundreds of years to recover (or water users will need to treat the now contaminated water before applying to crops).

The irreversibility of mining and coal seam gas impacts is one of the key reasons that farmers should be given some ability to opt out of such activities on (or even near in some cases) their land.

The outcomes from this type of policy should satisfy a broad range of interests.

1. Land use conflicts are more easily resolved by given some powers back to existing land owners.

2. By protecting the land itself those who want food security and local food produce benefit.

3. Those who want ‘agricultural open space’ benefit (people actually like knowing there are farming communities and driving through the country).

4. Farmers who want to be free to run their own business, protected from irreversible land damage benefit.

5. Those who want mining can do so if the impacts on surrounding land owners are sufficiently low.

Of course there will be problems to overcome during implementation, but in principle the policy appears sound. An indeed, the minerals and gas remain in the ground should future circumstances require their extraction.

The telco confusopoly

The one frustration that started me blogging more than three years ago was the confusing pricing practices of phone and internet service providers. It was quite obvious to me that their 'plans' where meant to be confusing to ensure the consumer could not easily identify the cheapest provider. Today, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has released a report that recommends improving price information for telecommunications contracts to avoid a 'confusopoly' (here).  Amongst other things -

The authority also wants to prohibit what it says are misleading advertising practices, such as the use of the term "cap" on mobile and broadband plans.

"It's not a cap, it's not a maximum, it's a minimum," Mr Chapman said

"We want to prohibit that unless its a genuine hard cap, so that if you exceed your limit the service ends or you get the opportunity to upgrade." (here)

Most recently I have been comparing mobile phone plans. Some of the cheap plans don't allow you to call 13, 1300 and 1800 numbers under the cap, and they all have different call rates, flag fall and penalties for exceeding cap limits. To actually compare providers you need to know your calling needs in advance and have the mathematical skills to run this call profile, and other scenarios, through a model of each available phone plan. Insanity.

As I previously wrote -

By consciously manipulating these two criteria of a free market [low barriers to entry and perfect, or at least good, information], all firms in the market are able to avoid a state of true competition that would produce the most efficient allocation of services, and are able to artificially inflate the value of the commodity, hence producing more profit for each firm in the market.

This is not meant to sound like a conspiracy, because indeed each firm does not need to meet in back rooms with the other firms in the market and all agree to limit customer information and the comparability of their products. They each simply need to aspire to the great marketing ideal of product differentiation, a concept that is fundamentally designed to artificially eliminate direct competition by removing direct comparability.
...

The power of product differentiation, through its ability to remove comparability and create an information gap to distort what could be a perfectly competitive market, can be demonstrated by the case of the term life insurance market in the US in the late 1990s. There was a mysterious and dramatic drop in prices across all firms that did not correlate to price drops in other forms of insurance, which themselves where steadily rising.

According to economist Steven D. Levitt, this can be attributed to the realisation of a perfect market through the power of the internet. Although term life insurance policies had been quite homogeneous before this period of time, the process of shopping around for the cheapest price had been convoluted and time consuming, whereas websites such as Quotesmith.com suddenly made the process almost instantaneous.

In just a few years, the value of the term life insurance market in the US had dropped by USD$1bilion because of the new found ease of comparability. What insurance firm would want this to happen? Even if you were a small player in the market, say a 1% market share, your turnover had just dropped by $10million. It is perhaps one of the great recent examples of the power of perfect competition in allocating resources efficiently, yet possibly one of the greatest blunders by the insurance industry.

I believe that the power of private enterprise is its innovative response to the financial risks it incurs, but with very simple regulation the innovative confusopoly, which comes at a cost to cosumers, can easily be avoided.  Indeed, most of the pushback against the telco confusopoly is from webpages which keep up-to-date tabs on plans from each service provider and enable you to take some rough guesses about future use and compare the cost effectiveness of each offering (eg here)

GDP down 1.2% for the March qtr

In the next 24 hours there will be a frenzy of economic commentary about the national accounts data and the importance of the last quarter's figure for the RBA board meeting next Tuesday.  My money is on no move by the RBA and more poor economic data this year.

For interest, below is the GDP per capita and Real net national disposable income per capita over the past deacde.  Notice the last few years (since end 2007) have been very flat for GDP per capita, and volatile but not really moving for net national disposable income per capita.

Brisbane and Perth housing slide continues

RP Data-Rismark released their dwelling price data for April today (here).  Brisbane and Perth are leading the price slide with Sydney and Canberra showing small gains.  This follows a stream of poor economic data recently.

I March 2010 I suggested that the next interest rate move by the RBA would be down.  I was wrong.  They increased another 75 basis points in total in their April, May and November decisions. 

My reason for suggesting they must move down is that the economy was much weaker than they anticipated, and the outlook far less bouyant.  Given this recent data one must think that their optimism is slowly fading.

2011 will be a very interesting year indeed. 

Learning to judge risk

No, this is not a post on financial risk. It is about child development and learning to judge risks yourself (a hot topic in my household).

As an economist parent this article, and the comments that follow, is very interesting. It begins...

Play equipment designed by  "safety nazis " doesn't allow children to learn from risk-taking, an expert has warned.

More kids aged two to seven were getting injured in playgrounds because they didn't know how to take calculated risks.

While it may seem obvious, learning to take risks involves... taking risks! There is an old saying that epitomises this attitude – if you want to learn to swim, jump in the water.

But it seems that Councils are not going to replace their plastic low velocity slippery slides and bouncy foam ground covers with splintered old wooden climbing frames in hurry. The experts still haven’t grasped the implications of their research. They conclude with the following advice.

To improve playgrounds, Ms Walsh suggested longer and bigger slides built into embankments to eliminate falls.

Also, smooth boulders for balancing, shallow ponds for exploring and plenty of vegetation to provide nooks and crannies for children to crawl around.

But if children learn from risk taking, shouldn’t they build high fast slides, with no ground protection and sharp jagged boulders for balancing and deep ponds for exploring?

In any case, the finger pointing at engineers and playground designers was thoroughly dismissed in the comments, with molly-coddling litigious parents copping a bit of heat.

Getting my head examined - a Chris Joye rebuttal

Don't get me wrong. I agree with Chris Joye on some things - lowering the inflation target (perhaps not right at the moment), pushing for a more streamlined NBN, and supporting Malcolm Turnbull's political ambitions.

But when it comes to the housing market the guy with all the numbers is happy to overlook the strikingly obvious and adores a verbal stouch with his foes - the group he calls 'housing nutters'. In fact he just recently recommended the following 

At the same time, anyone who claims that a 1% year-on-year retracement in dwelling values is a major asset-class event (cf. the share market frequently falling more than 5% on a given day) needs their head examined, with the greatest of respect. And I sincerely meant that latter caveat: you genuinely should seek medical advice if you are convinced that house prices are plummeting. 

Let's take his advice and examine what is in my head (noting that I don't believe a 1% year-on-year fall in national home prices in isolation is a concern). 

Joye often likes to draw attention to the low volatility of the housing market compared to the share market (eg here and here). But he neglects a few important differences. 

1. The housing market has at best monthly data only. Moreover each month's price data point is essentially an average. The share market would be far less volatile if you measured it that way and averaged away each month's price extremes. Not that volatility represent risk in any case. 

2. The share market is an equity market. If you want to compare like with like you need to compare the change in home equity to the change in share prices. If there is $1.7trillion in housing debt outstanding against $3.5trillion worth of housing, you can double any housing price change to calculate the change in equity of homeowners on average. Of course prices are set at the margins so perhaps for the price setting buyers and sellers the leverage, and importance of small price movements, is even greater. 

3. The negatively geared investor sets the market price (apart from the recent burst of FHBs). This means they are losing money every year. Any small decline in value decreases their equity substantially in addition to losses already incurred. 

4. The marginal homebuyer is heavily leveraged - 80% plus. This is not the case in the share market. Remember, leverage works to improve both gains and losses. 

5. The wealth effect is much stronger in the housing market than other markets, particularly due to leveraging and the sheer size of the asset compared to household incomes. 

6. Cost of home ownership is much greater than simply the interest cost. For most homes around 25% of the gross rent is spent on annual costs (refer to 3.) 

7. Housing market crashes, while they feel almost spontaneous, actually take some years to eventuate.

Irish housing - 5 years to fall 28%, or 0.41%/month

US housing - 6 years to fall 31%, or 0.38%/month

UK - 2 years to fall 21%, or 0.8%/month (and still 18% down from their peak 4 years later) 

8. Lastly, I feel sorry for anyone who shared Joye's property optimism and bought into the Brisbane or Perth property markets in the past two years.  While the share market hasn't been crash hot, 6% returns on cash has been pretty flash.

Anyway, if these notes are a sign of a mad man, well so be it ;-)

Wealth effect driven by the housing market

Leith van Onselen over at Macrobusiness has written a couple of very important and timely articles on the wealth effect. Put simply, the wealth effect is an increase in spending that accompanies and increase in perceived wealth.

In relation to housing, this paper suggests the wealth effect increases our propensity to consume by 9c per dollar of increased housing value (which is further supported here). So if the housing stock of Australia is valued at $3trillion (some say between 3.5 and 4 trillion), and market values increase 10% in a year, then we will spend on average 9% of the $300billion of new 'wealth', or $27 billion - with $6 billion of spending occurring prior to the end of the next quarter.

Importantly, this money is spent before it is earned by selling the asset. The easy access to home equity lending has been a contributing factor to the size of this effect, enabling households to spend their capital gains before they have been realised which increases their financial risk.

There are few readily available studies about the size of this effect in reverse, but if the same values hold in both directions we can look at some interesting scenarios.

If prices fall 2.5% nationally over a quarter then we lose $75billion of perceived wealth, with an immediate reduction in spending in the following quarter/half year of about $1.5billion and ongoing reductions in spending totalling $7billion

With about $1.7trillion of bank loans outstanding, that is about the same effect on spending as an increase in interest rates of 0.25% and keeping them there for two years (which will mean $4billion extra is spent on interest repayments per year). This of course assumes that house prices are not dramatically affected.  Indeed, if we consider that interest rate moves are likely to also bring down home prices, we can expect a much greater effect from the monetary lever.

That’s why house price falls of just a few percent can cascade into a crash so easily.

I would suggest the reason the wealth effect in relation to housing is much higher than found elsewhere is that many people who benefit/lose from house price changes are highly geared, which increases/decreases their equity more quickly for a given price change.

On this note I would add that you can’t directly compare share market volatility to house price volatility, since the share market is an equity market. To make a direct comparison you need to compare the volatility of the equity component of the housing market with share market, or the volatility of the share market value plus the value of debts held by those listed businesses to the housing market.

Peter Schiff predictions

Peter Schiff was ridiculed for years when he predicted that the US housing bubble and credit binge would result in a massive asset price bust and recession.  You could describe his economic philosophy as Austrian, and as the recent Keynes and Hayek rap video explains, the bust is a direct consequence of the boom, not some seperate economic event that can be avoided through government intervention.

In this early 2009 video Schiff predicts the collapse of the US dollar and makes some very astute observations that may resonate with Australians.  Enjoy.

1980s Texas Housing Bubble Myth - A Reply

Recently the debate on the price impacts of planning regulations has been a hot topic here and elsewhere. Leith van Onselen at Macrobusiness is one of the more sophisticated proponents of supply side impacts on home prices and recently responded to a comment of mine about Houston Texas. My comment was that if Houston is an example of how responsive supply can help cities avoid house price volatility, why did Houston experience a house price bubble in the 1980s?

Leith argued that Houston's apparent price bubble was a mere blip on the grounds of price to income multiples. In his typically evenhanded fashion Leith also notes many of the demand side factors at play during that time— the oil boom, liberalisation of loan standards, and population growth. He brings together these points with the following conclusion.

What makes Texas’ home price performance in the early 1980s particularly impressive is that prices managed to remain relatively stable in the face of significant demand-side influences that should have caused home prices to rise significantly and then crash.

An additional point is made that Houston has managed to avoid the 2000s property bubble infecting most of the US and much of the world.

My reply.

Houston prices declined around 40% in real terms following the 1982 market peak—that is indeed volatile—and it took 15 years for prices to recover in nominal terms.  The Case-Shiller 10 city index has dropped by a similar amount since the US peak in 2006 (30.5% nominally). So much for the volatility aspect.

But why do prices in Houston still appear so dramatically affordable when compared to incomes?

One major reason is the relatively high property tax rate.

Property tax rates in Houston more that doubled from 1984 to 2007 becoming one of the highest rates in the US. Depending on your area you can pay between 2-3% of your properties improved market value in annual State taxes, while the US National average is 1.04%.

One would expect areas with higher property taxes to have structurally lower prices, reduced price volatility, and much lower price to income ratios.

An illustrative example is shown below. The three comparisons are intended to roughly represent the early 1980s, the early 2000s, and today. The Houston property tax rates increase from two to three percent, while the comparison taxes increase from half to one percent. Interest rates also represent mortgage rates at the time.

From these examples we can see that from just this single factor, the property tax differential, we should expect prices in Houston to currently be structurally around 30% lower than national averages (more on the impact of the property tax differential here).

An important factor at play in this example is that at lower interest rates a fixed percentage property tax leads to greater price differences. Therefore, over time, we would expect Houston to home prices to be a smaller fraction of comparable homes elsewhere as the property tax differential has a greater price impact at lower interest rates. Remember that in the table above, rents and returns are the same for each comparison - only the tax rate is different.

Of course, this does not mean that housing is lower cost. It just means that the cost of housing is borne by annual tax obligations rather than capitalised in the price. A far better comparison of whether housing is structurally cheaper in Houston would be to compare quality-adjusted rents to incomes over time and across cities.

Perhaps once the property tax differential and other demand-side factors are properly considered we will see Houston's supply-side impact on housing prices diminish to zero.

Lastly, I would add that the memory of such a deep and prolonged property price slump would be motivation enough to dampen speculative housing demand in Houston. Who in their right mind would bid up prices in Houston knowing that increased tax liability and the history of dramatic losses on the property market?

Evidence of supply-side effects on home prices remains elusive.  

A sign of desperate times?

Saw this advertisement today in the Financial Review.  I haven't seen anything like it before but it reeks of desperation.  Is it some kind of joke?

I like the first part of the fine print "Real Estate agents tell me I can get $2.1million for my luxury home but..."

Rent seeking behaviour - scare campaigns

From the Hungry Beast

Housing stimulus idea

From Crikey:

Local bike paths mean higher house prices

That is one housing stimulus package I would be happy to see implemented.  From the comments section:

More accurate take on alternate headline –
Bikeways found to be desirable trait amongst urban home buyers.
Temporary shortage of bikeways elevates prices in areas with bike paths.
Once all areas have bike paths, price distortion will be nil.
Captain Planet

Demand shocks – the details

Many pundits claim that increasing population increases demand. In technical economic jargon it shifts the curve to the right. But what we rarely see is an exploration of the two types of demand shock and the different potential price impacts.

The first type, as mentioned above, shifts the downward sloping demand curve to the right. This means there are more people with the same willingness to pay.

The second type is a shift of the demand curve up upwards. This represents a willingness to pay more for the same goods from the same number of people.

It’s pretty clear from this distinction which of these factors is in play in Australian housing.

Let’s examine the first case. Consider an auction with 10 cars for sale and 50 bidders willing to pay $1000 for a car. You add another 50 people to the mix each also willing to pay $1000. If I’m not being clear enough, this is analogous to increasing population in the housing context.

When the auction is run with the original 50 bidders each car sells for $1,000. When the auction is run with 100 bidders, the 10 cars still sell for $1,000 each.

This is an extreme scenario but does demonstrate a very real point. Unless the new potential buyers are willing to pay more for the same items as the existing buyers, the price won’t rise. At most, a second price auction (the result of an English open auction with heterogeneous preferences) becomes closer to a first price sealed bid auction by the addition of another bidder willing to bid at a price between the second and first price (read up on some auction theory here).

As I said before, new buyers, even a small cohort of the total market, can influence the price level if they are willing to pay more than the existing buyers, since prices are set at the margins. Imagine our car auction once again, and we give 10 of our original 50 bidders and extra $500 to spend on the car. What is the new result? All cars sell for $1500 each to these 10 bidders. Even though they were just 20% of the original market of buyers, they dragged the price up 50%. In fact even if there were thousands of buyers willing and able to pay $1000 for those 10 cars, the ten people willing to pay $1500 would always win.

Prices are set at the margin by those with the highest willingness to pay.

This example, where the demand curve is shifted vertically to reflect an increased willingness to pay by the same number of buyers, is shown graphically in the right hand side graph above.

But, you say, the key problem here is that supply is being overlooked - in the simplified examples demand curves are horizontal and there is no supply response. But look at the graphs again. Not only is the demand curve a more acceptable shape, but supply does respond in both circumstances. In the first, where the demand profile of buyers shifts horizontally supply does respond enabling prices to remain at their equilibrium level.

However, when the demand curve shifts vertically, it doesn’t matter how much supply responds to price increases, it cannot be a mechanism to bring prices back down (except under extreme assumptions about the shape of demand and supply and the limits of peoples willingness to pay at the top and bottom of the market).

Of course, in the end this analysis is probably unecessary. The value of housing arises from the rents - its ability to generate revenue or provide a service. Since we haven’t seen rents outpace inflation significantly for any extended period in the past two decades, one must be quite certain that the cause of prices being much higher than a rational present value of future cash flows is pure demand side speculation.

Economics, Real Estate and the Supply of Land

As a general rule, economists relying on supply and demand curves without properly discussing the assumptions that sit underneath their graphs can be ignored.

Alan Evans' book Economics, Real Estate and the Supply of Land is an effort to refute Ricardian notions of land supply and rent, and offer an alternative neoclassical theory of land supply. The arguments in this book are taken by many who believe that reducing government involvement in town planning will decrease the price of housing. Evans’ reasoning is questionable to say the least, and supported by elaborate graphs with often biased assumptions and interpretations.

One of Evans’ aims is to refute the Ricardian proposition ‘that the price of land is high because the price of corn [read: houses] is high, and not vice versa’.

To do this he constructs a model economy with a fixed land supply where two agricultural uses compete for land – potatoes and corn. In the figure below we see his construction of this economy on the left, with demand for corn inverted so that the intersection of corn and potato demand determines the equilibrium share of land devoted to each crop, and the equilibrium rent of land at point A.

He then proceeds to add a demand shock to potatoes ‘for some reason’. The new blue line represents the new increased demand for potatoes which enables potato growers to bid up prices for land previously grown for corn and reduce the amount of land used to grow corn. He concludes with the following -

Now it is quite clear that the increase in the rent of land is not caused by the increase in the price of corn. Exactly the reverse is true. The price of corn has risen because the price of land has risen.
...
The rent for land is not solely determined by the demand for the product.

His conclusions are wrong.

First, it is still quite clear that at the new equilibrium the price of land for corn is still determined by the new higher price for corn. You could just as easily argue that every time a potato grower buys land from a corn grower he decreases the output of corn and the price of corn rises, thereby leading to an increase in the rents of land available for growing corn.

Second, he fails to notice that all he has done with the model is to demonstrate the inflation mechanism following an increase in money supply for one purpose. He increases total demand (potatoes plus corn) but shifts preferences towards potatoes so that corn demand is constant. The end result of his demand increase is to increase all prices in the model economy – potatoes, corn and rent.

Followers of Say would jump straight to this conclusion. You can’t simply increase total demand in the economy – demand is comprised of supply.

An actual demand shock, which models a change in preferences from corn to potatoes, is shown in the right hand side figure. You will notice that total demand remains constant and therefore the rents for this fixed quantity of land also remain constant.

So no, land rents do not determine prices. Prices determine rents.

Another example of poor reasoning is when Evans argues against a 100% land value tax. He argues that a tax of that nature would ‘freeze’ land development because there would be no incentive for a owner of agricultural land to sell his land to a developer for housing development, since he would not capture any of the value uplift. The rent achieved by the owner of the land will remain the same as when it is rented to the farmer – zero.

Yet in chapter 8 he argues that the value of land grows in anticipation of future higher value uses. In these cases, when the site is genuinely worth more as housing, the tax would be at a rate that reflects that higher value, and not the agricultural value. Therefore, the owner of the land will be facing a tax on the land value for housing while only receiving rents at agricultural values. As the city expands and the value of his land for housing surpasses the value for agriculture, he has a great incentive to sell or develop immediately to avoid losses.

Although I don’t support a 100% land value tax, I do support shifting the tax burden towards land and fixed rights to natural resources.

What we do learn from this book is that even the experts are prone to bias that affects their ability to apply objective logic and reason.

Faulty Reasoning

I’ve come across some fine examples of faulty reasoning lately in two key areas.

1. Analysing the economic importance of declining environmental quality, and
2. Assessing the impact of price drops in the Australian property market.

So let us take a closer look.

Pro-urban sprawl advocates (I didn’t really know there were so many until just recently) try to shrug off the claim of deterimental impacts on agricultural production from urban sprawl due to irreversibly land use changes. For example –

Suburban Development is not destroying farmland. Smart growth activists claim farmland is disappearing at dangerous rates and that government needs to protect farmland lest we lose the ability to feed ourselves. As growth expert Julian Simon wrote, this claim is "the most conclusively discredited environmental-political fraud of recent times." United States Department of Agriculture data show that from 1945 to 1992 cropland area remained constant at 24 percent of the United States. Though urban land uses increased, they now account for only 3 percent of the land area of the United States. Today, American farmers produce more food per acre than ever before. In fact, the number of acres used for crops peaked in 1930, but because of the ingenuity and innovation of American farmers, the United States continues to produce more food on less land. (here)

Why is this argument based on faulty reasoning?

Not pretty

Latest Econ Theory Keynes v Hayek rap video

Milk wars and Anti-Dumping

While there are many questionable assumptions in some economic theories, there are also many solid foundations to economic analysis. One of these was identified by Coles in its submission to the Senate inquiry into milk pricing (available in the Coles factsheet here).

The farm gate price dairy farmers receive is set by the world price because most Australian milk products are exported.


The first implication of this fact is that because prices are set by global markets, domestic buyers cannot buy at prices below the export market price - although they could perhaps be higher.

By following this logic Coles, or any other domestic dairy retailer, cannot exhibit bargaining power as a buyer from milk processors (or distributors). Dairy processors would simply sell all their products abroad, whereas the only alternative for retailers is to buy imported dairy products with associated freight costs.  Processors can then bargain the price up to the price of the retailers next best alternative of imported products. Thus, even though we are net exporters of dairy products we still pay a retail price for domestic dairy products very close to the retail price for imported dairy products.

And to provide further evidence against dairy industry claims, even if Coles did have market power, one must question why Coles would not already be getting milk for the lowest price anyone would be willing to produce for?

The sceptic in me might even go so far as to suggest that upsetting the political milk cart might have been a publicity strategy for Coles itself. News outlets have told the public that Coles is aggressively dropping prices for months now – all free of charge. You really can't buy publicity like that.

Of even greater concern than the media beat-up, and public perception of danger from falling milk prices, is that the law entrenches protection of local industries from international competitors through anti-dumping laws. As the Productivity Commission describes

Housing supply follow up – more evidence (UPDATED)

I promised to search around for some more evidence that local councils approve far more dwellings than are built. This would go some way to addressing the argument than planning is restrict, particularly zoning controls and approvals processes.

This report, by the Queensland Office of Economic and Statistical Reseach, adds to the previous evidence on a deevlopment approvals for subdivisions greatly exceeding the ability of the market to absorb the new land.  It outlines the number of development approvals for infill multiple unit dwellings in the pipeline at various stages of approval for South East Queensland.

The telling figure is that there are 48,152 approved new infill dwellings in SEQ, with another 29,014 at earlier stages of approval.  Remembering that there are also 30,566 approved subdividede housing blocks, we have a total approved supply in this region of 88,718 dwellings! Even at its recent peak population growth in SEQ was only 88,000 per year.  That makes about 2.5 years supply of dwellings already approved.

Other government reports which have compiled useful information on the potential housing supply available under current planning regimes.

This report notes the following

“...there appears to be a very low risk of the current broadhectare land not providing at least 15 years supply, particularly when the increased density and infill targets set by the SEQ Regional Plan are considered. Based on the SEQ Regional Plan assumptions for infill, then only 244,000 lots would be required over a fifteen year period”

Moreover it explains that the stock of approved lots represents 3.3 years supply.

We can take a look at a national level here and see that current planning schemes have the potential to yield 131,000 new homes per year for a decade from 2008! This excludes the increase in housing stock from developments with less than 10 dwellings.  In the abovelinked OESR report they state that smaller developments of 10 or fewer dwellings accounted for 69.5 per cent of projects at June 2010. This means the estimate of 131,000 new homes accounts for only 40% of the actual supply available under current planning schemes.

Even so, they sum up their analysis of land supply by stating that there was approximately 7–8 years supply of zoned broadhectare land in 2007.  

If this doesn't blow your mind...

I stumbled across this video on the web.  It's about growing organs... from scratch.  Absolutely amazing! 12 minutes very well spent.

Risk homeostasis, Munich Taxi-cabs and the Nanny State

There is an odd coexistence between two conflicting safety policies that may well be pursued by the same accident prevention agency. The first seeks to improve safety by alleviating the consequences of risky behaviour. It may take the form of seat belt installation and wearing, airbags, crashworthy vehicle design, or forgiving roads (collapsible lamp posts and barriers). This policy offers forgiveness for a moment of inattention or carelessness. The second policy seeks to improve safety by making the consequences of imprudent behaviour more severe and includes things such as speed bumps, narrow street passages, and fines for violations. Here, people are threatened into adopting a safe behaviour; a moment of inattention or carelessness may have a dire outcome. 

While these two policies seem logically contradictory, neither is likely to reduce the injury rate, because people adapt their behaviour to changes in environmental conditions. Both theory and data indicate that safety and lifestyle dependent health is unlikely to improve unless the amount of risk people are willing to take is reduced. (here - my emphasis) 

The above passage points out a common logical absurdity, and contains an important lesson for Australian’s with and overeager obsession of controlling personal choices through ‘nanny state’ regulations. More on the nanny state a little later. 

First, it is important to examine the hypothesis of risk homeostasis to properly understand the implication of the opening quote, since it claims that neither of the two contradictory policies aimed towards improving safety are effective. 

The essential argument of risk homeostasis is that humans have an inbuilt level or risk that they gravitate towards in response to their external environment. If we reduce the risk of an activity, people will compensate by finding other risky activities as a replacement, or undertaking the activity in a more extreme manner. For example, if we ban smoking tobacco, which doesn’t seem like such a remote possibility, do we really expect smokers to replace their habit with fruit snacks and yoga? Or might they compensate by increasing their alcohol consumption or perhaps smoking dope instead. 

Risk homeostasis is not to be confused with risk compensation, which suggests that individuals will behave less cautiously in situations where they feel "safer" or more protected, but that we don’t necessary return to a predetermined risk equilibrium point. 

Improving transport safety is an area where there is strong evidence risk compensation, and indeed of risk homeostasis. 

No evidence of supply-side constraints in approvals data

Possibly the central lesson of my previous post was that planning controls and development approvals by local councils are not a factor that limits the quantity of new homes constructed. Council behaviour in these areas could limit housing supply if councils began a system of quotas for approvals. But they don’t. They provide limitations on the location of new supply in their planning instruments, and they approve the quantity of homes demanded by the development industry - which is a reflection of the number of new home sales. Sales volumes of new homes and land determine the rate of supply of new dwellings. 

In my last post I provided no evidence for my assertion apart from logically examining the process of development in a hypothetical scenario.

So is there evidence that councils are limiting the supply of new dwelling through their planning controls and approvals processes?

No.

Let’s look at my home town of Brisbane. The following table shows the stock of approved house lots in Brisbane and surrounding local council areas that are yet to be developed (All data from here - Table 1. Excludes building units and retirement homes).



In Brisbane, where broadacre land is arguable more physically constrained, the stock of approved housing lots has remained relatively constant. And as you would expect, in the fringe areas, the stock of new house lots has grown far more rapidly than sales of lots or construction of housing. This indicates that councils approve far more housing lots than the market can absorb.

Yet it is this development approval that many claim is a hold-up to development.

In Brisbane, this reserve stock equates to about two years supply, while in surrounding areas there is between 3 and 10 years supply (Logan City and Somerset respectively) already approved. Of course, there are many thousands more lots that could be approved under existing planning schemes should demand arise.

Remember, this is just the stock of new land developments. If data were more readily available for unit developments there will no doubt be a similar story (in Brisbane attached homes are about 50% of new stock).

The clear message that comes from actual data on planning approvals is that they are not a constraint to supply. This might be one reason why these figures are never mentioned by ‘supply-siders’, even in the most detailed documents outlining supply side concerns in the housing market such as the 2003 Prime Ministers Taskforce on Home Ownership Report.

8 Economic Lessons on Planning and Housing Supply

The housing bubble debate often leads to claims that town planning controls and approvals processes are a contributing factor to the price boom. It is argued that such controls can constrain the rate of housing supply during periods of high demand, allowing prices to ratchet up. But there is no case for the argument that planning controls can influence the general price level of housing.

For those unfamiliar with property development, the following lessons may be of interest. 

Health economics –unnecessary treatment and economic costs of illness... and goodbye

This blog has been quiet lately.  The evidence is mounting in support of much of my earlier analysis of Australia’s housing market, while the Government attempts one more manoeuvre to bolster the market.  The supreme risks to the market are no longer a secret, and our chronic supply shortage has been receiving far less airtime.  There is very little for me to add to the current discussions.

One reason for the lack of posts is that I am studying for the GAMSAT test that one needs to pass before commencing a graduate degree in medicine.  Yes, my disillusionment with economics has driven me to seek a more useful profession. And despite my rational nature, I will give up quite a deal of income for it.  At least this economist knows that money doesn’t buy happiness.

In this final sign-off post it may be worthwhile taking a look at economic issues surrounding medicine and health care.  This is a burgeoning field, with demand growing for paper shufflers of this particular specialty, and universities eager to fill the void with a qualification.

My core argument in this field has been that increasing preventative health care, while having the benefits of a healthier and long life, often come at increased total lifetime health costs, rather than decreased costs as is often proposed.  Remember, we all die some day, and any potential cause of death postponed will allow another to take its place, which of course has its own health costs.  Alternatively, a more healthy existence may make us more productive for longer and lead to us contributing more in taxes over our lifetime than the potential increase in health costs which were paid through the tax system for our preventative care.

Governments, and subsequently economists, worry about these things because many health care costs are borne by others though tax revenue, yet the net economic effect is anything but straightforward.

In light of these concerns a cottage industry of economic analysis has developed pandering to the interests of particular interest groups involved in medical research.  Each disease these days seems to have a lobby group, and to ensure funding for further research it is necessary to argue in terms of economic costs and benefits of a cure or treatment. 

Over at Catallaxy Files there is an interesting take on the abuse of economics and shady use of statistics when consulting firms are asked to produce reports on the economic cost and impact of a particular disease. After prodding around the reports from one firm, the author notes that:

Adding up the estimated economic cost of all these conditions begins to exhaust the GDP, which suggests that the estimates of the economic costs are grossly exaggerated for a number of reasons.  This should not come as any surprise of course since the sole purpose of these studies – they have no academic credibility – is to provide RHETORIC  to bolster the case for the RENT SEEKERS who are attempting to prize out additional taxpayer monies to support their particular activities, worthy though they may be.

One of the real problems with these studies is the double/triple/…  counting associated with these studies as many people have multiple pathologies.  Moreover, the projections of the numbers afflicted by these conditions in the future should be treated with a grain of salt (probably box).

These studies also conflict with the findings of the Productivity Commission in their work undertaken in relation to the National Reform Agenda. In large part because most people with chronic conditions manage to continue their working life, the PC’s estimates of the cost of most chronic conditions (including mental illness) are not especially high.

The interesting work of Eric Crampton at the Canterbury University – great paper delivered at the Mont Pelerin Society – also shows that government studies of the economic costs of alcohol use are grossly exaggerated. There are typically  both conceptual and measurement mistakes.

I have a slight problem comparing the sum of a total cost of over time (total economic cost) with a flow of production in a single time period (GDP), but the general practices of double counting, including a potential undiagnosed population, and taking the extreme assumptions of the diseases impact and applying to every candidate, are intentionally misleading.

This is perhaps one reason why proponents of preventative medical treatments overstate the aggregate benefits to the community and subsequently the reduction in health cost borne by the taxpayer. Another reason preventative health care does not always provide net benefits can be explored at an individual level.

Movember have been a huge promotional success, yet at the heart of the charitable event is a desire to raise awareness of prostate cancer and promote early detection and preventative treatment.  However, this particular cancer is possible one case where the cure is worse than the disease at an individual level.

This article argues the case against early screening for prostate cancer.

They know that prostate cancer is overwhelmingly a disease that kills men late in life. The average age of death for prostate cancer in Australia is 79.8 years, while the average age for all male cancers combined other than prostate cancer is 71.5.

The average age of death for an Australian man is 76 so on average, men who die from prostate cancer actually live longer. In 2007, just 2.8 per cent (83 men) who died from the disease were under 60, and 10 (0.1 per cent) were in their 40s.

The author notes that the unnecessary treatment undertaken by many men as a result of early testing often leads to impotence and occasionally incontinence, when there was a very high probability that they would have died from another cause before the cancer severely impacted their health. 

Medical associations and governments try hard to examine these issues prior to funding and promoting preventive health care.  Where current screening techniques return too many false positives the chances of over treatment are severe. One the other hand, a screening technique returning a high number of false negatives may not be such a concern if the disease develops slowly and screening is recommended periodically.

In all, it seems that the health industry is not immune to manipulative economic analysis and rent seeking behaviour.  I am sure there are positive ways economics have been contributing to debates on public health, yet in the haze of spin it gets very little publicity. 

Thanks to all my readers for contributing ideas and thoughts on this blog in the past few years. 

Merry Christmas.

Cameron

Parkinson's Law

Work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion

Some might know Parkinson’s Law as it has been quoted above, yet the implications of this law are rarely acknowledged.  In bureaucracy this is especially the case. I have witnessed it firsthand.  Ironic, since the ever-expanding British bureaucracy was the focus of Parkinson’s original 1955 article.

Parkinson’s work may have been seen as mere parody, yet his insights appear to be consistently proven over time.  This very blog post was achieved under pressure of time, utilising this Law to my advantage.  Had I allowed myself and hour it would have taken an hour.  Since I allowed myself just 30 minutes, with a 3pm deadline, magically, I expect it to take that long.

Parkinson’s explains the theory behind his law starting at a position best summarised by this passage:

Granted that work (and especially paper work) is thus elastic in its demands on time, it is manifest that there need be little or no relationship between the work to be done and the size of the staff to which it may be assigned.

He finishes with this gem of a formula explaining the continuous growth in numbers of bureaucrats.

(Where k is the number of staff seeking promotion through the appointment of subordinates; p represents the difference between the ages of appointment and retirement; m is the number of man-hours devoted to answering minutes within the department; and n is the number of effective units being administered... and where y represents the total original staff)

Parkinson notes that this figure will invariably prove to be between 5.17 per cent and 6.56 per cent, irrespective of any variation in the amount of work (if any) to be done.

The figure for Australian States in the past decade was a measly 3.1% - still significantly faster than the rate of population growth.  Yes, government is outgrowing the country.

A further development of Parkinson’s ideas is his Law of Triviality, which suggests that organisations give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Parkinson dramatizes his Law of Triviality with a committee's deliberations on a nuclear power plant, contrasting it to deliberation on a bicycle shed. A nuclear reactor is used because it is so vastly expensive and complicated that an average person cannot understand it, so they assume that those working on it understand it. Even those with strong opinions often withhold them for fear of being shown to be insufficiently informed. On the other hand, everyone understands a bicycle shed (or thinks he or she does), so building one can result in endless discussions because everyone involved wants to add his or her touch and show that they have contributed.

The Law of Triviality can be expanded to apply to the state of public debate surrounding important political decisions.  Debate over where to host the local Christmas carols often trumps the debate surrounding reform of the banking sector or our participation in wars in the Middle East.  Perhaps we simply prefer not to think about these big issues for fear of being overwhelmed.  

In all Parkinson's insights seem to be rarely used to our advantage.  

GDP only positive because of rain drenched agriculture

Today’s National Accounts figures were not a huge surprise - except, of course, to many of the mainstream economic commentators, some of whom continue to demonstrate their undying faith by stating that the decline is nothing to worry about.

Neither are the downward revisions to the June quarter figures worth a second look.  The June quarter growth trend down was revised down from 0.9% to 0.7%, and seasonally adjusted down from 1.2% to 1.1%.

And possibly my favourite lines from the ABS release –

In seasonally adjusted terms, Agriculture (up 21.5%) contributed 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth driven largely by strong forecasts for grain crops... GDP increased 0.2% in the September quarter, while non-farm GDP fell 0.2%

If it wasn’t for the surge in agriculture driven by last season’s strong rains, GDP growth for the quarter would have been negative, and for the year, just 2.3%.

Perhaps it is time to revisit some forecasts by our favourite economists back in September.

Peter Jolly, NAB - Our year ended GDP forecast has lifted to 3¼% from a little under 3%

Christopher Joye, Rismark - The economy is about to embark on a period of above-trend growth

Warren Hogan, ANZ - Hogan believes we are about to see a period of serious inflationary pressures thanks to the commodities boom's income wave

Michael Blythe, CBA - reckons the income surge will add 3 or 4 per cent to GDP over the next couple of years.

Yet the serious inflationary pressures and above trend growth seem to be a little hard to come by at the moment.

At least I can give myself a plug.  Heck, isn’t that what economists do?  My prediction from early September - Inflation and GDP will surprise on the low side in the September quarter.

Steve Kates explains much better how the data early in the year was deceptive due to the dramatic impact of fiscal stimulus, and that the private sector recovery is yet to appear. 

Mid-week links

Using the National Accounts to better estimate changes in well being (PPT link) – from the OECD Measuring Progress Agenda.  Aka - Why I don’t feel like I benefit of changes in GDP.

A better comparison of the cost of living in cities around the world?  Numbeo provides a user generated cost of living index for any city in the world, with prices updated continuously as users add price data. 

One interesting comparison - Consumer Prices in Munich are 14.65% lower than in Brisbane, and

Consumer Prices Including Rent in Munich are 5.13% lower than in Brisbane. 

Who desires a longer commute? Apparently a 7% of people desire an extra 5 minutes commuting time (from here) -

In one of their studies, Mokhtarian and Redmond examined the commute (i.e. the trip to and from work). They conducted a survey in the San Francisco Bay area which asked subjects what duration their ideal commute would be, and whether their current commute is the “right” length or not.

Counterintuitively, very few people expressed a desire for a commute of “zero.” The most frequent response put the ideal commute at 15-19 minutes, and almost a third of the sample actually said their ideal commute was over 20 minutes. Only 1.2 percent answered zero; this surprising result was largely borne out in follow-up focus groups, where subjects were prompted that zero was a permissible answer.

A comparison of respondents’ ideal commutes and their actual commutes revealed that while most (52 percent) wanted their journey to work to be shorter, 42 percent reported their commute was about the right length and seven percent (mostly those with short commutes) actually wished it would take them an additional five minutes or more longer to get to work. On average, people wanted a commute of around 16 minutes.

I suspect there may have been confusion from respondents about what the question was asking – Do you desire to live in a location where the commute is X (longer, shorter, zero etc)? Or, do you want the commute from your existing location to work to be X (longer, shorter, zero etc)? Or, what is the ideal commute time from your current location with current transport systems?

More on the Peltzman Effect - Night clubs are employing emergency medics to monitor the crowd, yet the Australian Medical association has concerns that it gives a false sense of security to revellers. I can just imagine the conversation – “If you want to experiment with new drug X, do it here because they have medical staff!”

Finally, from The Onion, a spoof economics and finance article that might just make it to the front page of an Australian daily newspaper.

WASHINGTON—Some sort of tax cut or earnings or money or something was reported in economic news this week in further evidence that a lot of financial- related things have been going on lately.

According to numerous articles and economics segments from major media outlets, experts on banks and such have become increasingly concerned over a new extension or rates or a proposal or compromise that could signal fewer investments, and dollars, and so on.

The experts confirmed that the stimulus has played a role.

"This is a clear sign of a changing cycle," some top guy at one of the big banks in New York said of purchasing power parity or possibly rate of return during a recent interview on CNN. "Which isn't to say that a sustained drop in wages couldn't still occur, even if the interest paid on reserves is lowered."

"In short, it's possible but not probable that growth could outpace our initial expectations," added the banking guy, who went on to say other money things, too. "It depends on investor sentiment."

The man, who also apparently mentioned the Nasdaq, the Dow, and the Japan one at some point or another, talked for a really long time about credit or reductions or possibly all these figures, which somehow relate to China.

Greece was also involved.

Prison, parenting, selection bias, and measuring success

In both parenting and the legal system one must carefully consider the role of punishment.  Recently, the discussion surrounding imprisonment has become focussed on rehabilitation, using recidivism rates inappropriately as a statistical measuring stick of success.  This seems to be the product of confusing success in parenting with success in crime prevention.

Updates and a CityCycle apology

Plastic bag banning continues to gain momentum

Well known demographer Bernard Salt had a stoush with Dick Smith in a little documentary a few months ago discussing Australia’s population growth.  Now he is back with more nonsense.

Brisbane’s CityCycle scheme, from my observations, appears to be well used.  I was pessimistic about the potential take-up rate of the scheme, but in the past six weeks of operation I have seen 27 people using these bikes – about 26 more than I expected. I do however live across the road from one station, work in a building adjacent to a station, and cycle past another half dozen twice per day.

Interestingly, I have seen one person using the scheme helmetless and smoking while talking on a mobile phone (I don’t have a problem with this if they are not riding dangerously, which they weren’t), and one bloke walk up to the bikes in work attire and promptly retrieve a helmet from his backpack before shooting off on a hire bike.  I can only hope that with more (are there more cyclist, or just people deciding to use the scheme to avoid bike theft and wear and tear?) cyclists there will be a strong push for more user-friendly bike lanes.

And just for fun, a hilarious rap battle between Keynes and Hayek to entertain the inner economics nerd.

Sin tax myths – why smokers reduce health costs

Smokers have been the target of Australia's latest sin tax. Meanwhile, debate continues over using sin taxes to reduce consumption of 'unhealthy' foods such as soft drinks and confectionary.

(The word unhealthy is used quite loosely due to the fact that there is sufficient uncertainty about health – Are eggs good or bad these days? Margarine? – and because it is typically not the food itself, but the quantity consumed of a single food that is unhealthy.  Almost any food item consumed in excess will be unhealthy).

The primary arguments in favour of sin taxes are that

1.      the taxes reduce ‘harmful’ or ‘unhealthy’ consumption, and

2.      the taxes raised offset likely health costs such behaviours incur on others.

Unfortunately neither argument is compelling.

Public and Private schools – evidence from economics?

As an Australian parent in 2010, the public versus private school debate is hard to avoid.  In a society where private schooling is becoming the norm, yet literacy and numeracy skills are stagnating, how does one objectively analyse the costs and benefits of school choice?

First, let me say that school choie is just one factor determining vocational, personal and emotional skills during adolescence.  Genetics, parenting, the home environment, peer groups, sports and other club activities, amongst many factors, all contribute to shaping young minds. 

Additionally, the composition of students at the school plays a strong role in determining academic outcomes.  Many private schools for example, offer academic scholarships.  If those students had instead attended the local public school, any difference in average academic results may be greatly reduced.

How then does one separate the impact of school choice from these other factors?

Without the opportunity to conduct controlled studies, for example, by studying twins who attend different schools while holding all else constant, the best analysis of the measureable benefits of private schooling would be a statistical test of various measures of ‘success’, controlling for external factors such as parental intelligence and education, household income and location, and child’s intelligence prior to arrival at the school.

Unfortunately, in this debate one of the most overlooked considerations is what measure of 'success' would potentially make private schools ‘better’ than public schools. Is it simply a matter of final grades and tertiary entrance scores, or do parents (and children) value a broader measure of success? Does a public school with more diverse student cultural backgrounds give a better social experience, or does a private school offer more valuable professional connections?

The results of any statistical study will necessarily be narrowly defined to reflect the impact of school choice on a single measure (such as academic test scores), ignoring social benefits and opportunities for extracurricular achievement. 

So what do economists and social scientists have to say?

Talking climate with Warwick McKibbin

I met RBA board member Professor Warwick McKibbin yesterday.  Alas, his reserved academic demeanour was a successful deterrent to a gruelling discussion on monetary policy and his thoughts on Australian housing.

I was, however, enlightened about his academic research and particular area of expertise – macro-economic modelling and climate change.

For such a diminutive guy he manages to raise a large public profile and promote intense debates on matters of macro-economic policy.  He was intensely critical of the government stimulus package, although many economists see it as very well implemented in hindsight.  


Some of the critics of the implementation of Australia's fiscal stimulus fail to see the broader political picture.  Professor Tony Makin, for example, argued that the fiscal stimulus was not necessary because adjustments in exchange rates and interest rates absorbed most of the impact of the crisis.  Yet he gives no credit to domestic impact of fiscal stimulus from abroad, particularly with our main trading partners.  His argument was that we should have been free riding on the stimulus of other nations.

The broader political picture reveals that there was an explicit agreement by G20 nations in November 2008 to take coordinate fiscal action to avoid this very issue.  In an international context our stimulus appears light on – maybe we still did partly free-ride.

But McKibbin is clearly most passionate about climate policy, driving hard his ideas for coordinated global action – The McKibbin-Wilcoxen Blueprint for climate policy.

Rates surprise

The RBA Board decided to raise official interest rates by 25 basis points today against my, and many other economists, expectations. One wonders if they take pleasure in proving forecasts wrong, or whether they are simply following the cardinal rule of monetary policy - defy expectations.

Unfortunately I think it is the destabilising thing to do, and maintain that we may see this decision reversed in the future.  With a housing market waiting to crumble, tourism and education exports fading, commodity prices peaking and inflation already moderating,  expect some sullen economic data this festive season.