One percent realty – a revolution in the making

Real estate agents have a poor reputation.  The cynical side of me would say that they get paid a lot for doing very little.  Unspoken collusion results in an unwillingness to negotiate commission from the maximum allowable, which, under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Regulation 2001, is $900 plus 2.5% if the price is over $18,000.  Almost ten years on residential property prices have increased is many areas by 300%, yet agents still typically charge this maximum amount in a 'take it or leave it' fashion.

But things are changing fast. 

Housing and population updates

Australian housing finance is falling rapidly with prices likely to follow.

This graph of historical prices and housing finance approvals deserves a look. Also, the graph below was part of the RBA's Luci Ellis' speech on housing last week and was referred to as follows:

Australian housing debt is higher relative to housing assets now than in the past (Graph 4). We should expect this ratio to be higher than in the 1970s and 1980s. The financial regulation of that period artificially restricted household borrowing. For example, unmarried women found it hard get mortgages back then. The question is whether this measure of leverage is higher than can be sustained. After all, it is much lower than in the United States, even before their boom-bust cycle. But we should expect that to be true. Because they can claim home mortgage interest against their tax, American owner-occupiers have less incentive to pay their debt down than their Australian counterparts.
...
Recent data suggest that we do not have a credit-fuelled speculative boom on our hands.

I wonder what data would be required for Ellis to conclude otherwise? If it was so easy to see a speculative bubble in the data, none would ever form.

Finally, a word of caution about the graph. It is the ratio of debt to value. Therefore a rise can be caused either by an increase in debt or a decrease in home values. Clearly the dramatic lift in the US ratio in 2008-09 was caused by declining asset prices, not increased debt.

Strangely Ellis concludes that a 40% aggregate debt ratio was a massive bubble in the US, but 30% in Australia is not apparently, even though we should expect this relationship due to differential tax treatment of mortgage interest.

The RBA is sounding very confused these days.

On another note, the 'population growth increases house prices therefore the Australian market is safe' point of view is looking very shaky. Latest BIS Shrapnel report forecasts significant declines in population growth in the coming years.

BIS Shrapnel says annual net overseas migration - which includes permanent migration and longer-term but temporary stays - will fall from its pace of 298,900 in the year to June 2009 to 240,000 in the year to June 2010. It will fall more dramatically to 175,000 in 2010-11 and 145,000 in 2011-12.

Friday quick links

Latest research suggests that government owned banks are better for growth than private banks.

Another potential rebound effect - encouraging snus instead of cigarettes might lead to another avenue for nicotine addiction and potentially more cigarette use.

A belief in supernatural communication with the dead must surely be evidence for irrationality

One reason (not) to get an iPad - freedom from porn

Housing crash makes us winners and the bubble checklist

It’s no secret I am forecasting price declines (or prolonged stagnation) in the Australian residential property market. The intricacies of this topic have led many to the conclusion that the government won’t let that happen - there are simple too many people going to lose in the short run, even if we may all benefit in the long run. While I agree that the government may not let this happen (although foreign ownership rules are being tightened up again), and may produce an arsenal of economic weapons we haven’t even though of yet, I disagree that there are more losers than winners from a significant housing price correction.

The mainstream ‘more losers than winners’ message is aptly summarised in this article:

The only people who would rejoice in a house price slump, it seems, are the young and aspirational. As Willem Buiter put it in his 2008 paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 'Housing Wealth Isn't Wealth', “…the young and all those planning to trade up in the housing market are made better off by a decline in house prices. The old and all those planning to trade down in the housing market will be worse off.”

This view is wrong.

Friday quick links

My childhood street is famous for building cubby houses in trees on council land

Obesity epidemic growing for a century - much longer than ever thought before….
and now Jamie Oliver does his best to tackle obesity the ‘old fashioned’ way, but faces strong resistance in the US, even after success in the UK. He faced tough opposition on the Letterman show:

'I don't care how much ground up sea grass you eat or wheat germ - or stuff you find in your pocket. As long as they are selling 160 different types of cookie what hope do you have?'

Oliver appeared to become resigned to the fact he wouldn't convert Letterman to his way of thinking, turning to the audience and saying: 'As you can see ladies and gentlemen, my challenge is big.'

Does this support a 'sin tax' on junk food, or are we aware of the obesity externality and simply don't care, making obesity an optimal outcome?

China housing bubble and government intervention
Beijing recently introduced much tighter rules for home loan lending. The discount on the mortgage rate for first home buyers has been cut, while discount for second-time home buyers has been scrapped altogether. In addition, second-time home buyers have to make a deposit of 40 per cent of the value of their home, while people buying their third home have to come up with a 60 per cent deposit.

A bit of social engineering for home ownership that just might work? Would there be any major problems implementing such restrictions in Australia (we could start a company to buy the investment property, but then only have tax beenfits in the 30% corporate tax bracket, and face the costs of company reporting requirements)?

Interest rate gamble
Looks like my bet was closer to the mark than it first appeared with weak lending data (a leading indicator) pointing to house price declines. Will the RBA let that happen?

More support for a National Resources Fund (this time from RBA chairman Warwick McKibbin)
RBA board member Warwick McKibbin suggests that Australia follows Norway’s lead and sets up sovereign wealth fund that goes beyond the narrow ambition of the Future Fund to finance public service pensions. Norway’s 4 million souls now own a fund worth more than $US400 billion, throwing off a big contribution to national income every year.

Interest rates up

The RBA maintains its credibility today by following through with their threats of a rate rise, and in the process, making my forecast look ridiculous.  I still maintain that declining asset prices will pressure the RBA to decrease rates in the near future.

The combined impact of the cessation of the FHOG boost and the interest rate increases of 2010 paint an interesting picture for Australia's housing market.  Obviously my bearish outlook remains.

Glenn Stevens' predicament: He wants us to believe interest rates are heading up without actually putting them up

I imagine it is a tough job being the nation's central banker. But the recent television interview with Glenn Stevens, RBA Governor, has made it quite clear the predicament he currently faces.

Stevens warned that property speculation is not the path to riches (the Real Estate Institute of Australia was apparently surprised by this statement). Obviously he is very worried about the stability of Australia's massive residential property market.  But to achieve the desired outcome, he needs to fool us all.

Affordable housing supply from a market crash

It seems that no matter what the objective market conditions are like, the same lobby groups (the Housing Industry Association and the Property Council of Australia for example) and property spruikers continue to trot out the housing shortage claim in an appeal for government assistance.

If you truly believed there is a housing shortage and hence an affordability crisis, a market crash (price declines >20%) is the best solution. I will outline my reasoning by referring to the appropriate economic models – the same models misused by those who believe that government intervention is causing supply constraints.

Why the next interest rate move is down

Most economists predict another rate hike by the RBA. I am not like most economists and predict the next move will be down. My reasoning is founded on the unfortunate necessity to maintain housing values in order to avoid serious disruption to our financial system. The RBA will move strongly to reduce the interest burden on debt should they see evidence of a fall in house prices (aka values). The following snippets are therefore worrying for the RBA:

Thinking like an economist

This article is the first I have come across that compares housing prices and costs to hours worked, which is the ultimate measure for comparing housing affordability across countries or over time (although hours worked for average rent would also be a good measure).

According to the CommSec analysis it now takes 19,374 working hours to pay for an average house at the average hourly rate of pay, compared to just 7,500 hours in 1960.  That's ten years of full time work in 2010 versus 3.9 years in 1960.  I admit the data may be a little skewed if it is truly generated using averages (means), rather than medians, however there seems to be a strong message coming through.

It also supports my claim about the leisure dilemma, and the ability of others to bid up prices if they choose to work more hours.

Housing investment is not productive

Property spruikers are currently having a field day proclaiming the productivity of housing investment. These claims are fallacious. Housing investment does NOT improve productivity.

To clearly explain why this is the case we first need to define productivity. Productivity is a measure of output from a production process, per unit of input. A productive capital investment therefore enables more future goods and services to be produced per unit of input (such as labour, materials etc).

An example of a productive investment may be a machine that enables a new design of metal fasteners to be produced from less metal, and with less labour time, but is equally as strong. In this case we have a productivity gain in terms of materials and human labour time for the same output. This investment allows use to produce more fasteners in future periods even with no more inputs.

Housing does nothing of the sort. It simply houses more people and does nothing to improve the per capita productivity.

Let's use a little thought experiment to prove the point.

CPI update

I was attempting to create a 'Make your own CPI' spreadsheet that uses the ABS price indexes for each commodity group and allows you to assign your own weighting.  I was also using the weighting from the German CPI as a comparison (which weights housing as 30% of the basket, while Australia's CPI has housing at 19% of the basket).

But there was a problem.

The price indexes for each commodity group were so completely manipulated by quality adjustment (and any other unknown statistical manipulation that occurs) that you could not dramatically change the final CPI figure.  Using German weightings I was within one percent (of the total change) over a 10 year period.

Have a look at the house purchase index used for the CPI against the ABS' own capital city house price index in the graph below.  The extreme magnitude of the disparity is quite shocking.  The index used for the CPI increased by 36% over the 7 year period, while the capital city median price index increased 92%.

What lesson should we take away from all this?  I for one will never trust an official statistic without first understanding the methodology behind it.

Fail: CPI, housing and the cost of living

This short article about inflation, and the ABS review of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), prompted me to write again on the subject.  In fact, some friends and family who recently returned from a few years abroad have also been bugging me about why Australian prices have shot up so much, yet we hear almost nothing about rapid inflation.  Housing prices in Brisbane have typically increased 200% in the past decade - around 7% per year.  If housing was just 10% of the CPI basket, it alone would contribute 0.7%pa growth to the index.

First, let's be clear about the purpose of the CPI.  In principle I believe that measuring the price level is impossible as the type and quality of goods and services in the economy changes constantly. However, some indicator about the changing cost of living is still important for determining changes to welfare payments and calculating real growth in incomes. 

Unfortunately, not many people know that the CPI does not measure the change in the cost of living (see p6 of the ABS CPI overview report here).  The ABS method, including quality adjustments and the weighting of household consumption goods, means that the CPI fails to be a useful measure for determining real incomes and purchasing power. 

The Australian property market debt gamble

Investing and gambling are often mistaken for each another.  In one, you take risks based on known probabilities, in the other, unknown probabilities.  In one, you will probably win in the long run, in the other, you are bound to lose out.  In both pursuits we are psychologically predisposed to scams.

I find it interesting that prudent advice for gamblers is to risk only your own money, while for investors it's a different story - the more leverage the better.  But there must be an optimal level of leverage, otherwise we would all simply continue to borrow and destroy the value of the currency through money creation.

Given the realities of our world, one would expect that leverage below this optimal level would not persist for an extended period, as people would begin to notice the advantages of more leverage, nor would leverage or debt beyond this optimal level be able to persist.   It is therefore interesting to ask how would we know if we are above this optimal level?

UPDATE - How not to climb the property ladder

I really appreciated the discussion on my last post, and wanted to clarify some of the issues raised.

My two key points were:
1. The capital gain made from buying a cheap home and upgrading later does not always improve your ability to buy a larger place in the future, and
2. That forgoing life's little luxuries to start a savings plan directed at owning your own home is not always effective.  The 'work hard and save' mantra does not work if prices increase faster than your ability to save.

The issues flagged by readers were that
1. I ignored increased wages
2. I ignored the paying down of principle, and
3. I ignored the fact that rents increase in line with CPI while loan repayments do not.

My response is under the fold.

How not to climb the property ladder

Baby boomers and older generations often cite high expectations, and the inability to save, as the main hindrance to the younger generations’ ability to buy their own home. They go into great detail about how much it has always been a struggle to buy a home, and that if young people decreased their expectations and bought something small they could work their way up the property ladder.

I am one of those generation Ys looking to buy my own home, and from this perspective, it is not quite that simple.


The mythical property ladder
The argument that if younger generations decreased their expectations, and maybe bought a small apartment now, so that they could somehow work their way up the ‘property ladder’, is entirely misleading.

For example, a young couple buys an apartment for $200,000 in lieu of a $400,000 house they really want based on the contemptuous advice of older generations. They imagine that in 10 years they might be able to sell for $350,000, netting a profit of around $100,000 to spend on a larger home (after transfer costs). The problem is that larger homes have also increased in price by 75%, so that the $400,000 house is now $700,000. Buying that dream home has gone from a $400,000 prospect to a $600,000 prospect even with the apparent advantage of being on the property ladder.

The way to benefit from increasing property prices is to buy multiple investment properties, so that you leverage the benefits beyond your single dwelling needs.

No more avocados
Next, we can look into the arguments about spending a little less on luxuries to get a person into a home-buying financial position. Dining out, gadgets, and holidays all seem to get mentioned. But if we look into it, these relatively small expenses are not the main factor – the main factor is income.

A hypothetical future home buyer might spend $200 per week on dining out, ‘gadgets’ (mobile phones etc), and travel. That’s $10,400 per year – maybe $3,000 on a trip to SE Asia, $2,000 on gadgets, $2,000 on dining out, and the balance for other luxury items. Let’s see what that money could have done if it were funnelled into a property-buying strategy.

Assuming a starting point with no savings, this hypothetical person (or couple, or family) can save about $58,000 in 5 years assuming they receive 6% on their savings. If they thought they might one day want to live in a home that currently costs $300,000, by the time they save their $58,000 the home is worth $400,000 (at a 6% price growth rate). They now need $80,000 for their deposit. They continue saving instead of splurging and in another 5 years they have $137,000 saved. The home is now worth $535,000. They have enough for a deposit, but the repayments on their home and associated ownership costs are now around $900/week.

So after ten years of saving, living life without those luxuries that make it so much more enjoyable, they are in no better a position than before.

I’ll leave you with a question. If you bought a home for $100,000 in 1990, and the market his risen so that it is now worth $600,000, how much better off are you?

A graph I promised to make

There is a lot of talk about population and number of new dwellings in the housing market debate.  What is generally overlooked is that at any point in time everybody is living somewhere.  Occupancy rate is fluid, prices change, and in the long term, population growth in an area can't happen without prior construction of housing. 

The graph shows the new dwellings constructed per new person (per person of population growth).  We do notice a recent decline in the number of dwellings being constructed nationwide compared to the population growth, which is reflected in the later graph showing increased occupancy rates.  The direction of causation amongst these variables remains unclear, and in all likelihood, they are interdependent.

Regression with net new dwellings per person of population growth as an explanatory variable for change in the capital city price index gives a negative coefficient (-0.011) but really, has no explanatory power (r2 of 0.006).

That means that analysis of population growth and dwelling construction figures has no power in explaining housing price changes.

Australia's most expensive house

The previous record for Australia's most expensive single dwelling (don't think it falls into the house category, nor even the mansion category) was a measly $45million.  Just this week that record has been smashed by a respectable figure of $57.5million for a Perth waterfront mega/super/ulltra-mansion.


(What was he askin'? $70million - tell him he's dreaming!)


It shouldn't be a surprise that the sale was from one mining baron to another.  In Brisbane mining companies have a reputation for sending lots of cash in a hurry.


What shocked me was the claim from the real estate agent the he had sold Australia's most expensive house back in 1980 - for just $2,150,000.


Times have indeed changed.

Tax me, please

People hate taxes. But they are necessary, and some are better than others.

Henry George’s arguments in his 1879 book Progress and Poverty are that all benefits from progress accumulate to land owners. He proposed a single tax on land because the value of the unimproved land is unearned, neither the land’s value nor a tax on the land’s value can affect productive behavior. If land were taxed more heavily, the quantity available would not decline, as with other goods; nor would demand decline because of land’s productive uses.

I agree. A land tax is by far the least bad tax. Milton Friedman even agreed – “In my opinion, the least bad tax is the property tax on the unimproved value of land, the Henry George argument of many, many years ago.”

There are many reasons to prefer land taxes.

Australia, meet Dubai

The property market is Dubai is crashing and burning as we speak.  It was inevitable of course, but never underestimate the perseverance of a property boom.

On that note I want to talk about the future here in Australia.  In 2010 and beyond I foresee the following sequence of events.

1. Rate hikes of another 0.5%
2. Property prices will flatten and fall in some areas
3. The government will run out of ways to keep housing demand propped up – we had more cash injections and foreign buyers (although as yet I can’t imagine what else may be dreamt up).
4.  Inflation will be a major concern again – the USD will recover and the fuel price here will head up.
5.  September 2010 will lead to another correction on the share market, taking the ASX200 down below 4000 again.
6.  But then a strong rebound in November up to 4400
7.  House price will stabilise at 10% below their peak (in nominal terms) but real growth in house prices will not occur until 2015.
8.  A Current Affair and Today Tonight will has specials about house prices crashing in certain areas and people being forced out of their homes by mortgagees.
9.  Even while this is happening, people will continue to shout and scream about a housing shortage and argue for reduced taxes on developers (even though we have the world's biggest houses)
10.  The 2011 census data will show that demolition rates were less than expected and that the total number of dwellings in Australia is higher than expected (the remarks by the RBA’s Ric Battellino seemed a bit pushy on the supply constraint issue).

It’s not a catastrophic forecast, but it seems reasonable to me. Anything I've missed?